On 7th April 2017, two American destroyers – USS Ross (DDG-71) and USS Porter (DDG-78), operating in Mediterranean, have launched an attack with 59 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The target was Sheyrat air force base in Syria. It was a response to alleged chemical attack against civilians, for which the West holds responsible Syrian government, of this war-torn country. However, the doubts about the circumstances surrounding the incident still remain, so let´s go over them. 

Counter-balance of Israel´s nuclear arsenal

Syrian program of development of chemical weapons dates back to 1970´s, with the help of friendly Egypt and USSR. It has reached the level of self-sufficient production of toxic agents in the middle 1980´s. Syria has perceived this weapons program as a counterbalance to the Israeli nuclear program and has not acknowledged it until recently. Before the start of Syrian civil war, the stockpile was estimated to be around 1000 tons of various toxic substances, among them several hundred tons of Sarin, the same amount of mustard gas and few tons of VX. While Sarin and VX were stored in binary form, while mustard gas was ready for immediate use. During the possible conflict, the main carriers of the chemical substances to the enemy targets were artillery and air force. The most notorious carriers of those weapons were considered ballistic missiles R-17 “Elbrus” (NATO code name SS-1C Scud-B and SS-1D Scud-C) along with more modern OTR-21 “Tochka” (NATO code name SS-21 “Scarab”), which could be loaded with sarin, VX or mustard gas. Multiple rocket launchers, able to fire missiles with chemical weapons, were represented by Iranian types, using 302 mm; 320 mm & 600 mm ammunition. Present were also 122 mm rounds for BM-21 “Grad” MRLS. The air force was allegedly prepared to use bombs loaded with 100-300 kg of sarin, depending on particular model.

The beginning of “chemical war”

First rumours of usage of chemical weapons in Syrian civil war appeared in March 2013, when loyalists and militants blamed each other of usage of chlorine gas, near the village of Khan al-Assal near Aleppo. Later in august of 2013, the White House issued a statement, in which it declared, that Syrian army has “repeatedly used chemical weapons in small amounts against opposition”, while the aim of those attacks was to achieve “upper hand on the battlefield or to blow decisive strike on the important parts of the front, where it became stalemate. It was reaction to the attack from 21^st August 2013, where 300-1700 people died on Damascus´s suburb Ghouta, after being exposed to sarin. United States, Great Britain and France immediately accused Syrian government (the main evidence was, that quantity and quality of the substance was military grade and industrially produced). However, the appointed UN investigation committee never clearly declared the culpability of one side. Russia had declined this version and stated, that rebels were behind those attacks. After pressure from international community, when USA threatened Syria with direct military intervention, was Bashar ASSAD in October 2013 forced to sign the protocol about use of chemical weapons and allow OPCW inspectors to visit 31 places, which facilitated production and storage of military toxic substances. Moreover, the Syrian government declared, that it owns 8 units of mobile launchers, able to load chemical ammunition and it manages 3 facilities, that are active in research and development of such substances. In general, those institutions have stored around 1308 tons of chemical ammunition (from which 1047 were in storage tanks and packages, while 261 tons were loaded in various projectiles), which were transported out of Syria before the end of July 2014 and destroyed. The question remains, if it was the whole stockpile or Syria kept small amount of those toxic substances, in order to start small-scale production again later.

Target: Khan Shaykhun?

Since the incident from august 2013, there were records of usage of less sophisticated and less dangerous and freely available on the market, which were deployed either as improvised rocket projectiles or dropped from helicopters in barrels. The extent of losses in such incidents was limited, usually in few numbers. However, everything changed on 4^th April 2017, when the city of Khan Shaykhun, held by Islamist radicals from Jabhat fatah as-Sham (Jabhat al Nusra – affiliate of Al-Qaida), allegedly became a target of chemical attack. Nevertheless, the whole incident is surrounded by many contradictory and unclear facts to this day, and it is difficult to re-enact the whole sequence of events.

Let´s give it a try and summarize the known facts. In the morning hours of 4^th April 2017, Syrian town of Khan Shaykhun was targeted by airstrike of Syrian Sukhoi Su-22 fighter-bomber. After the strike, 70-100 people died of exposure to sarin or similar substance and 300-550 people were wounded. Let´s focus on the version presented by opposition activists and associated organisations, which says, that between 6.00 and 7.00 local time the town was hit by 4 bombs. Three of them were conventional and the fourth was chemical. Alleged witness named Husam SALUM, often quoted by western media, has stated, that he has seen the arrival of Su-22 from distance of 1,5 km in low altitude and subsequent simultaneous release of 4 bombs in one run. After release, the fourth bomb didn´t explode with usual manner, but rather created thick white cloud of white smoke. This cloud subsequently spread and covered at least a part of the city. Husam SALUM has added: “We have found out, that it was toxic gas from the rescuer, who has entered the zone of impact. He told is in the radio, that he can smell unusual odour and then started to suffer from dizziness and started to faint”. Such widely spread information by mainstream media are hardly verifiable and should be considered cautiously. First of all, the source of those claims are radical Islamist militants and their sympathizers, which can not be considered unbiased. Second point - sarin is transparent, colourless liquid without any odour. Thus it hardly could create visible cloud and exposed people could never recognize it by its smell. Third point – dropping of one bomb on the city inhabited by 50 000 people doesn´t have any military significance. While political consequences of such action would be catastrophic, which is obvious for every sane person – especially in the time, when Donald TRUMP´s  then press secretary Sean SPICER, on 31^st March 2017 said, that “concerning ASSAD, it is political reality, which we need to accept”. Besides above mentioned oral statement of the survivors, many videos and pictures from Khan Shaykhun have appeared, where we can see victims and shallow crater in the tarmac, allegedly created by impact of aerial ammunition. While earlier pictures show the place of impact on the road in “raw” condition (asphalt fragments and also fragments of used ammunition), on the later images part of the debris is cleared away, red warning table is installed in the shallow crater, along with latex gloves thrown around.

Crater of such small diameter could never be created by common fragmentation bomb, used in Syria, with calibre 100, 250, or 500 kg. The impact of missile (for example S-5, S-8 or S-24), as well as artillery shell of 107 or 122 mm also doesn´t match the resulting crater, because there is not damage by shrapnels on the road or surroundings (few meters away, there is electricity distribution box without any damage). Also, it is highly doubtful that chemical bomb would create such crater after its impact – in fact it doesn´t create any characteristic crater at all (since it has only minimal amount of explosives) and is usually detonated in the sky, before impact to the ground, in order to effectively spread its load into surrounding. Moreover, no chemical bomb, which can be deployed by Sukhoi Su-22, creates debris, which doesn’t match fragments found in the crater.

Let´s focus on the remains of ammunition used. In fact, it is suspicious, that chemical bomb, which doesn´t destroy its target by power of its impact, and only serves as its carrier of toxic gas, there is little left of it. On the pictures, there are only two steel fragments visible, which can be linked to the incident. The bigger piece, stacked into the ground, is twisted and torn tube of dark green colour, the smaller piece being relatively undamaged rounded item, probably sealing from the tube. Interesting is the way, in which the tube was damaged – it seems, that it was pushed in to the ground by the force of explosion and perforated in the process. Also, significant power of detonation created several meters long cracks in the asphalt.

According to the renowned American weapons expert and professor emeritus of science, technology and international security on Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Theodore A. POSTOL, this damage rather indicates, that one stage of the 122 mm rocket, containing  8-10 litres of sarin, was placed on asphalt and demolition charge was placed on its top, which was subsequently exploded and spread the substance into the air. However, we can´t exclude the possibility, that the source of intoxication was not at all located in the area of the target. It is very unlikely, that this area was contaminated, judging from the groups of people, gathering around the place of explosion, documenting the event, without any protection, and conducted fake collection of samples.

So if we admit, that Syrian air force couldn´t be behind this attack, the question is, where could the culprits acquire this chemical substance. Could they produce it by themselves, steal, take in from the government forces (before destruction of Syrian chemical arsenal) or acquire it from abroad (Iraqi army had an arsenal of 122 mm rockets with chemical warheads). This is what we don´t know. Since the area is under control of radical Islamic militants, there has never been international investigation committee or OPCW inspectors on this location, which could objectively inspect and confirm or deny accusations. Thus, many doubts and speculations will remain for a long time, if not forever.

Dusan ROVENSKY

Note: author, born 1977, has been in active service in Czech army since 1996. He underwent basic army executive, commanding and staff posts. Between 2003-2004 he attended U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy in Fort Bliss. In 2002 he participated on military mission in Kuwait and in 2006 in Iraq.

This article is a translation of original text, appearing in Czech ATM magazine, 06/2017; pages 14-17. The ATM magazine has been published since 1969.